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For the last sixty years Japan has had a constitution that renounces war, and although it has 
a Self-Defense Force that constitutes one of the strongest militaries in the world (at least in 
terms of weaponry), 2  Japan’s use of this military potential is strongly restricted by the 
constitution. 
The Peace Clause in the Constitution is article 9, which states: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,3 land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.4 
From the time of its coming into force, there have been some who have sought to remove the 
peace clause from the constitution. Constitutional change has been a goal of the Liberal 
Democratic Party from its beginning.5 In recent years, this trend has become particularly strong 
and there are currently concrete moves being made to amend the constitution. During the year 
2005 both major political parties and both houses of the Diet separately produced documents on 
constitutional change, all of which recommend some form of change to the peace clause.6 The 
Liberal Democratic Party has produced a draft for a new constitution, and given the current 
strength of this party, this draft must be taken as an indicator of the direction in which the 
movement for constitutional change is moving. The draft makes two important changes in the 
peace clause. Firstly the second paragraph is changed to a statement that Japan possesses a Self 
Defense Army for the purpose of defense and secondly it states that the Self Defense Army can 
carry out actions “in international collaboration to preserve peace and security in international 
society,”7 thus not only removing any restrictions on the maintenance of a military force, but 
opening the way for that force to be dispatched to any part of the globe. In fact the preamble to 
the proposed new constitution includes the statement that “While recognizing variety in value 
systems, we [the Japanese people] carry out unceasing efforts in international society to 
eradicate oppressive government and human rights abuses”8—suggesting the possibility of a 
fairly proactive and even interventionary approach to international relations. 
 
The Rationale for Changing the Peace Clause 
Arguments in favor of Japan changing the peace clause can generally be aggregated into three 
general rationales.  
One rationale is that since the constitution, and particularly the peace clause, was forced on 
Japan, it does not reflect Japanese national identity, and it would be more consistent with 
sovereignty for Japan to produce its own constitution. In actual fact, there is more ambiguity 
than is sometimes realized in how the peace clause came to be in the constitution. It has long 
been asserted that the recommendation for the clause came from the Japanese Prime Minister of 
the time, Shidehara Kijuro, although some Japanese commentators have argued that this 
suggestion is not consistent with Shidehara’s political views.9 The Asahi Shinbun, in August last 
year, reported that a letter has been found that was addressed to Shidehara from Shiratori 
Toshio, a Japanese war criminal and former diplomat. The letter recommended that Shidehara 
make the proposal to Macarthur as a quid pro quo for maintaining the emperor system.10 In 
other words, since Japan with the emperor would still seem threatening to Japan’s neighbors, if 
the emperor system was to be preserved, something needed to be done to remove this sense of 
threat. The peace clause, then, was the means to guarantee Japan’s peacefulness and thereby 
maintain the emperor system. This explanation overcomes the conflict between Shidehara’s 
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political views and the proposal of the peace clause.  
There can be no doubt that once this proposal was made, there was coercion on the part of the 
General Headquarters of the Occupation. However, this coercion was necessary only with regard 
to the Japanese government, not with the people. They welcomed the peace clause, and if it is 
true that the Japanese government accepted the peace clause under coercion, it is equally as true 
that the Japanese people were as much a part of the coercion as the GHQ of the occupying 
forces.11 
A second rationale is that the current constitution excessively restricts Japan’s capacity for 
defense. Since, even with the current constitution, Japan has developed one of the strongest 
militaries in the world, this may not necessarily seem a convincing argument, but in 
Japan—given the perceived threats from North Korea and China and given that many Japanese 
are not very aware of the strength of the Self-Defense Forces—it is a persuasive argument. 
Although, as I will argue later, it is not the rationale that is most driving the actual political 
decision making process, it does seem to be the one that most convinces the ordinary people of 
Japan of the need for change. 
An associated rationale here is the question of whether Japan should be able to exercise the 
right of collective self-defense. The current constitution does eliminate this possibility. It is 
argued by quite a number of thinkers that Japan should change this. The notion that there is a 
need for Japan to be able to participate in collective self-defense with the US, particularly given 
Japan’s dependence on the US for defense, is what lies behind this thinking. This rationale 
constitutes an important part, perhaps the most important part, of the driving force behind the 
movement for constitutional change.  
The third rationale has to do with Japan’s participation in international peace keeping 
activities. It is argued that Japan, as a leading economic power, should be willing and able to 
shoulder a greater burden of the task of maintaining peace in the world. In the debate within 
Japan, this is often associated with Japan’s desire for a permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council. To have a position on the Security Council, it is argued, Japan would need to be 
able to take full part in UN peacekeeping operations—something that the present constitution 
does not permit. Therefore, it is argued, constitutional change is a requirement for Japan to get a 
permanent seat on the Security Council. (Actually, quite the opposite is more likely to be true. It 
is very unlikely that Japan’s neighbors—particularly China and Korea—would be willing to see a 
remilitarized Japan on the Security Council. The opposition of these countries would probably be 
insurmountable). 
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the rationale relating to defense, both from the 
perspective of direct defense and of exercising the right to collective self-defense. I will discuss 
the defense rationale particularly in terms of that central concept of international relations, the 
security dilemma. I will have a dual focus in this. That is, I will focus both on the implications 
that the security dilemma has for the question of Japan changing its constitution, and also on the 
question of what can be learned from Japan’s experience over the last sixty years in terms of 
finding ways to resolve the security dilemma. I will discuss the issue of exercising the right to 
collective self defense in terms of the risks involved in alliances (entrapment and abandonment) 
and also in terms of the impact constitutional change would be likely to have on the movement 
towards multilateralism in the Asia Pacific region and on Japan’s participation in that 
movement. 
 
 
I. THE DEFENSE RATIONALE AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA 
 
The Security Dilemma 
The notion of a security dilemma was first raised by the political scientist John H. Herz in 
1951, although there is a slight difference in meaning between Herz’s original conception and the 
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idea of the security dilemma that has been handed on and that Herz himself subsequently used.  
Herz, in his original postulation of the security dilemma, suggested that as human beings 
developed consciousness they became aware of the possibility and inevitability of death, and thus 
became concerned with preserving their own lives. As a consequence of this, human beings 
started to become conscious of possible threats to their existence, and therefore to see others as 
possible threats. Perceiving others in this way then led them to a disposition of mistrust and 
suspicion towards others. This disposition then led them to a stance towards others such that 
they themselves come to appear as a threat to those others. Thus, distrust and suspicion became 
mutual: 
Cain makes his fellow men appear to him as potential foes. Realization of this 
fact by others, in turn, makes him appear to them as their potential mortal 
enemy. Thus there arises a fundamental social constellation, a mutual suspicion 
and a mutual dilemma: the dilemma of “kill or perish,” of attacking first or 
running the risk of being destroyed.12 
This leads people to a confrontational and competitive relationship with others. At the same 
time, however, people have both a necessity for other people in order to survive and a strong feel 
of affinity to others, a sense of sympathy for and empathy with others (Herz uses the word “pity”) 
that leads them to seek friendly and harmonious relationships.13 As Alan Collins describes 
Herz’s view, the original postulation of the security dilemma describes  
a situation in which humans, knowing that they require the assistance of fellow 
humans in order to survive, are faced with a dilemma because they are aware that 
these same humans are capable of killing them. They must choose social 
interaction to survive even though this very action could bring about their death. 
The dilemma arises therefore because of their uncertainty regarding the other's 
intentions towards them.14  
It is the tension between the perception that others may constitute a threat on the one hand and 
the need for and sense of empathy with others that Herz originally described as the security 
dilemma.  
As is clear from the above, Herz does make note of the fact that the acquisition of power, 
motivated by feelings of insecurity, creates a sense of insecurity in others. The notion of the 
security dilemma as it is understood today, and as Herz himself generally uses the term, refers to 
the outcome of this insecurity engendered in others who then seek power in order to remove the 
threats to their own security. In other words, I build up my own power in order to counter what I 
perceive as a threat. Those by whom I felt threatened see this increase in my power as a threat 
to themselves. They acquire sufficient power to counter that threat. Thus the attempt I have 
made to protect my own security, by provoking others to increase their power, has actually 
increased the threat to my security. 
In essence, the security dilemma defines a situation whereby one actor—in its 
traditional manifestation, the state—in trying to increase its security, causes a 
reaction in a second, which, in the end, decreases the security of the first. As a 
result, a (spiral) process of action and reaction is manifest in which each side's 
behaviour is seen as threatening.15 
Another exponent of the security dilemma, contemporaneous with Herz, was British 
historian, Herbert Butterfield. His description of how the interaction of fear develops will help 
elucidate the dynamics of the security dilemma: 
It is the peculiar characteristic of the situation that ... you yourself may vividly 
feel the terrible fear that you have of the other party, but you cannot enter into the 
other man's counter-fear, or even understand why he should be particularly 
nervous. For you know that you yourself mean him no harm, and that you want 
nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; and it is never possible for 
you to realise or remember properly that since he cannot see the inside of your mind, 
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he can never have the same assurance of your intentions that you have.16 
As Alan Collins points out, this  
highlights the very essence of the security dilemma. None of the participants 
intends the other harm, it is just their fear which leads each to view the other with 
suspicion. This fear and the worst-case thinking it generates (the 
better-be-safe-than-sorry mentality) can lead to a deterioration in the relationship 
despite neither intending the other harm. Hence, Butterfield's assertion that the 
"greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great 
criminals who might be out to do deliberate harm in the world. It could be produced 
between two Powers both of which were desperately anxious to avoid a conflict of 
any sort." The very essence of the security dilemma is that it describes a situation 
in which uncertainty can lead to the pursuit of actions which are paradoxical 
because they make matters worse—it is a tragedy.17 
In another work, Herz, (using the term in the sense that has become common) writes, "it is one of 
the tragic implications of the security dilemma that mutual fear of what initially may never have 
existed may subsequently bring about exactly that which is feared most".18 
 
The Security Dilemma in the Post-War Context 
It is not surprising that this concept of the security dilemma should emerge in the early 
1950s—just as the world was putting the Second World War behind it and bracing itself for the 
Cold War. The lessons that seemed to need to be learnt from the two world wars were 
contradictory, thus creating a dilemma. In the nineteen-twenties, there was a widespread 
perception that the First World War had been brought about precisely by countries taking a 
strong stance aimed at deterrence. As Garrett L. McAinsh points out,  
none of the Great Powers had really wanted a general European War in 1914. The 
war appeared to have been caused not by some militaristic plot, but by the 
unwillingness of everyone concerned to back down in the crisis which preceded it. 
… the lesson of history seemed to be that patience, compromise, even a willingness 
to retreat—in other words appeasement—stood a far better chance of preserving 
peace than did stubborn rigidity in the face of foreign provocation.19  
Disarmament and appeasement, thus were the ways to peace. However, disarmament had left 
the world unprepared for the emergence of a threat such as Hitler, and appeasement came to be 
seen as having failed miserably at Munich. Failing to stand up to a dictator, it seemed clear, only 
resulted in stimulating the greed of the dictator.  
Many politicians seem to respond only to the most recent lessons of history, so that the 
outcome, to a large degree, was for the lessons of the July Crisis (the period from the 
assassination of the Archduke of Austria in Sarajevo on 28 July 1914 until the actual outbreak of 
war on 4 August) to be lost and only the lessons of the failure of appeasement to be brought to 
bear on decision making in the post-war era. As MacGregor Duncan has pointed out, “The 
popular ‘lesson of Munich’ – as propounded by countless western leaders – holds that making 
concessions to an aggressive state can never succeed in pacifying the aggressor and thereby 
preventing war. As a result, it contends that aggression must be checked early if one is to avoid 
the proliferation of disaster.”20 As Duncan points out, since 1945, there have been repeated 
references by politicians to the “failure of Munich.”21 In fact it tends to be drawn into the debate 
in almost every major conflict that arises. References to the July Crisis in political debate today, 
however, are for all practical purposes non-existent. 
The recognition of the security dilemma in the early 1950s may perhaps best be understood 
as a way of taking full note of the lessons of Munich without forgetting previous lessons of 
history, particularly the lessons of the First World War. Precisely because these lessons are 
contradictory they create a dilemma. A dilemma is a beast of two horns, and the horns of this 
dilemma seemed to indicate that taking a strong military stance could lead to warfare and so 
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could the failure to do so. That is what makes it a dilemma, for it leaves the decision maker in a 
“damned if you do and damned if you don’t” situation. While recognizing the ambiguity that 
results from this may not be particularly helpful to a politician in terms of the ballot box, nor 
perhaps in the context of parliamentary debate, it is neither wise nor realistic to lose sight of 
either side of the dilemma. Only when both sides of the dilemma are firmly held in sight can a 
realistic approach to policy-making be achieved 
 
The Security Dilemma in History 
To understand the significance of the security dilemma, it may be helpful to look at some 
historical examples. The security dilemma can be found to be relevant to many of the wars of the 
twentieth century. We will begin with the First World War. 
After having achieved unification in 1871, Germany saw its greatest threat to lie in the 
formation of a coalition by France, Austria and Russia. In the words of David Fromkin, “This, 
the most dangerous of possibilities, corresponded to Germany’s fear of being surrounded.”22 The 
risk of Austria taking part in such a coalition was largely relieved by the alliance with Austria in 
1879, but even after this, Germany continued to consider as a major threat the possibility of an 
alliance between France and Russia.  
How realistic were these fears? How likely were France and Russia to form such an alliance? 
Fromkin describes it as “an unlikely combination on ideological grounds, for France was an 
advanced democracy and Russia was a backward tyranny.”23 In fact the Czarist government of 
Russia was more likely to align itself with monarchical Germany than with democratic France, 
given its desire to resist the rising tide of democracy. However Germany’s fear, and the military 
build up that it undertook to cope with that misperceived threat created exactly the situation 
that Germany had feared. France and Russia did, in fact form an alliance in 1894, “Driven 
together—against the odds—by the German threat,” as Fromkin points out. 24 
Insofar as the possibility of a coalition between France and Russia posed no threat to 
Germany to start with, but became a real threat precisely because of Germany’s threat 
perception, this constitutes a fairly clear example of the security dilemma. Since the 
confrontation between Russia and France on the one hand and Germany on the other is one of 
the major factors that led to the First World War, and since Germany was to lose that war, this 
seems a very good example of a threat anticipation creating the very situation, in fact the 
absolute worst case scenario, that it sought to avoid. It would be a mistake, of course, to ignore 
other factors such as competition over colonies, growing economic dependence on arms 
production, etc., in the background to the war. Still, it does seem clear that the security dilemma 
constituted a highly important factor in the background to this war.  
The July Crisis is also sometimes described in terms of the security dilemma. The quotation 
above from Garrett L. McAinsh indicating that “none of the Great Powers had really wanted a 
general European War in 1914” is consistent with this. There are some who argue otherwise. 
Fromkin points out that German Chancellor Bethman Hollweg did in fact want war—at least as 
a preemptive strike in what he considered an inevitable war.25 This can be taken as indicating 
that it was not the security dilemma (in which, strictly speaking, neither side really wants war) 
that was behind the outbreak of war. However, it may not be appropriate to dismiss the role of 
the security dilemma so easily. The process of suspicion and threat that characterizes an 
escalation resulting from the security dilemma is likely to enhance the influence of more 
hawkish persons on the decision making process and perhaps even bring such persons to the 
center of government. Therefore the presence of people in the decision making process who 
actively want war may not necessarily exclude the security dilemma as a factor. It may be that 
they have come to power precisely because of the apprehension and fear associated with the 
security dilemma. 
There are other major conflicts of the twentieth century that could, at least in part, be 
considered examples of the security dilemma. The outbreak of the Second World War in the 
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Pacific, in fact, may be one. Japan had, since the last quarter of the 19th century, sought 
acceptance by the west. The slogan datsua-nyuuou (leave Asia, join Europe), which was one of 
the main guides of Japanese policy at the end of the nineteenth century and in the first quarter 
of the twentieth, and the importance that was placed on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, are both 
indicators of the intense desire that Japanese had for inclusion within the West. It was its 
encounters with Western racism and particularly what was felt to be unfair treatment at the 
Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that caused frustration in Japan and led to the policy of 
confrontation and eventually to war. What may relate this to the security dilemma is the fact 
that all this took place at a time when there was a particular threat perception in the west 
towards the peoples of Asia and particularly towards Japan. This threat perception was 
expressed in terms of what was called the “Yellow Peril.” To the extent that the idea of the 
“Yellow Peril” motivated the decision makers to try to suppress Japan, and to the extent that 
suppression drove Japan into isolation and confrontation, the process is a reflection of the 
security dilemma.  
There were reasons within Japan for Japan’s turn to militaristic expansionism. It would be a 
mistake to treat it exclusively as a response to the ideas of the “Yellow Peril.” Yet it remains true 
that Japan’s transition from seeking acceptance by the west to undertaking confrontation did 
take place precisely at the time that ideas of the “Yellow Peril” were rife. From the last decade of 
the nineteenth century predictions of a race war were prevalent in the West, and much of this 
focused on Japan as the prime threat. Indeed it was Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War 
that had prompted Kaiser Wilhelm II to originally promote the idea of the “Yellow Peril,” and 
when Japan followed up that victory with a victory over Russia in 1905, Japan came widely to be 
seen as the power likely to unite the “yellow race” and lead it into war against the west.  
It would, of course, be impossible to measure the degree to which the treatment of Japan was 
influenced by these fears. The actual decision makers may not have held such ideas, although 
they may still have been influenced by the popular views within their countries. Nevertheless, 
the exclusivist immigration policies of Australia and the US, the rejection of Japan’s racial 
equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference, the frustration of Japan’s goals in China, 
etc.—all of which had a role in turning Japan towards a confrontational stance—did occur in the 
heyday of ideas of the “Yellow Peril” and anticipations of future class wars.26 
The Vietnam War, too, was grounded on a threat perception, the Domino Theory, which was 
already being considered to be dubious by the mid-1960s27 and has not been borne out by 
events—in that the loss of Vietnam did not lead to a spread of Communism to any countries not 
actually drawn into the war. This, again is an example of an incorrect threat perception leading 
to a conflict and creating the very situation that it had aimed at averting. 
The origins of all these wars are, of course, quite complex and there are numerous factors 
that give rise to them. The attempt here is not to reduce the causes of wars to one particular 
phenomenon, but to show that the security dilemma is a real phenomenon—that indeed it does 
happen that misplaced fears of threats can bring about the emergence of those very threats, in 
other words that fears can become self-fulfilling prophecies. This is true of course, even when the 
fears are intentionally created by people in power in order to further their own personal or 
political agendas.  
Since much of the debate about changing Japan’s constitution is centered around 
threat-perceptions, this would seem to be a serious issue for discussion in regard to 
constitutional change. What are the risks that changing the peace clause of the constitution 
would create the very risks that it seeks to avoid? Before taking this up, however, and for 
reasons that will become clear in the following pages, I will look at possible approaches to 
dealing with the security dilemma. 
 
Dealing with the Security Dilemma 
The problem with the security dilemma is precisely the fact that it is a dilemma. While it 
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might be easy, in retrospect, to say that a particular fear was unrealistic, to the people at the 
time it inevitably seems realistic and there may be no sure way of demonstrating that it is false. 
John Herz suggested that 
The way out of this security dilemma of mutual or one-sided fears and suspicions 
is to place oneself in the other's shoes and view the world from his vantage point. 
By doing so even American ideologues might get rid of their obsession with 
communist world-revolutionary plotting and comprehend the Soviets' ‘national 
interest’ in preserving a postwar status quo that, after all, has rendered them one 
of the world's two superpowers and bestowed on them a powerful position in 
Europe and Asia.28  
However, seeing the world from the other’s standpoint or placing oneself in the others shoes 
may not be all that achievable. We can never get fully inside someone else’s mind. We may 
never be absolutely sure that we know another person’s intentions, so the “better safe than 
sorry” approach of taking precautions against a possible threat will always be a powerful 
argument. If threats could always be dismissed as misperceptions, of course, the solution would 
be simple. But then there would be no dilemma. The dilemma arises from the fact that the 
perceived threat may be a misperception, but it may well also be an accurate perception. To 
focus only on one side of the dilemma would be to ignore either the lessons of the July Crisis or 
the lessons of Munich. While no one can read the future, we must assume that realistically 
there will always be the possibility of threats becoming real. If we are to find a way of dealing 
with the security dilemma that prevents it from giving rise to wars, it will have to be a strategy 
that takes both sides of the dilemma into consideration. 
The problem that lies at the heart of the security dilemma is, of course, the fact that that the 
very means one takes for one’s own defense becomes a threat to others. The solution therefore 
would be in having a means of defense that did not constitute a threat to others. The idea of 
collective security as established in the United Nations was seen as a means to achieving this. As 
Foster Dulles pointed out “A by-product of this [collective security] is that national forces are so 
combined with each other that no national force, alone, is a menace.”29 The idea was to have 
multiple parties involved in a network of defense, without any particular party being powerful 
enough to threaten others. However this presumed a certain parity among states that, due to the 
emergence of superpowers, has not in fact been realized, either during the Cold War or since. 
Consequently, this resolution to the security dilemma has had limited success although it 
remains one of the important principles behind the growing interest in multilateralism, which is 
becoming a more prominent feature of international relations, particularly in Asia. 
 
Japan’s Constitution and the Security Dilemma 
The security dilemma has received relatively little attention in Japan. There is not even a 
fixed translation for the term. Sometimes it is simply transliterated using the Katakana script.30 
Otherwise it is translated literally as Anzenhoshou no Direnma (or Jirenma), 31  or 
Anzenhoshoudirenma.32  
There is in fact a good reason for this lack of attention. The whole idea of the security 
dilemma is predicated on the fact that the means that one country adopts for its defense is 
perceived as a threat by other countries. Thus a military build-up intended as a means of defense 
is seen as an indication of aggressive intent by other countries. If there is something that makes 
it apparent to neighboring countries that this military build-up will not be used aggressively, the 
security dilemma will cease to be an issue. This is clear from the very nature of the security 
dilemma. Obviously, whatever it is that guarantees that military forces will not be used 
aggressively must be convincingly clear to neighboring countries, but if this is convincingly clear, 
then it should be possible to develop an adequate defense without triggering the kind of 
escalation of suspicion and threat characteristic of the security dilemma. 
Japan is a democratic country with an independent judiciary. While some may argue that 
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there are limitations to its democracy and to the independence of the judiciary (as there may 
well be with all democratic countries), the Japanese government could not ignore basic 
principles of the constitution. It could not ignore article 9 of the constitution and invade another 
country. This very fact means that even if Japan possesses a strong military, neighboring 
countries, at least insofar as they are confident that the peace clause of the constitution will be 
maintained and respected, have no reason to perceive that military strength as a threat. In fact, 
for most of its post-war history, there has not been a significant short-term prospect for a change 
in article 9 of the constitution, and for that reason Japan has been able to build up considerable 
military power without that military power constituting a serious or proximate threat to 
neighboring countries. In this sense, Japan has been protected from the security dilemma by the 
peace clause. The lack of attention to the security dilemma in Japan has presumably resulted 
from it lack of relevance—until now—to Japan. 
Since the early 1990s, this has changed significantly. Particularly since the Gulf War, there 
has been an escalation of talk in Japan about changing the constitution, and this has made 
neighboring countries much more cautious about Japan. The history of Japanese aggression has 
not been forgotten in Asia, and moves toward re-militarization are looked at with a considerable 
degree of mistrust. An Agence France-Presse report in 2004 noted that “Japanese moves to 
overhaul its 'defense-only' security policy that could enable it to launch pre-emptive strikes on 
foreign missile bases will trigger a wave of unease across Asia” and that “Any suggestions that 
Japan is taking a higher military profile have unnerved China and other Asian countries that 
were invaded by Japan during World War II.”33 
This does make clear one of the risks involved in Japan changing its constitution. If Japan 
were to change the peace clause of its constitution, the meaning of Japan’s military capacity for 
neighboring countries would change immediately. The security dilemma would immediately 
become an issue (in fact the very discussion of constitutional change has already made it an 
issue). If Japan changes the peace clause in its constitution, the threat that Japan’s military 
power will come to constitute will be very likely to trigger an arms race, or, more accurately, to 
accelerate an arms race that is already underway. Such an arms race would heighten tensions 
generally in the area. It should be remembered that this arms race would take place in a region 
in which there are already very serious flashpoints, most particularly on the Korean Peninsula 
and across the Taiwan Strait.34 The risk is not simply that tensions and possibly even conflict 
could arise between Japan and its neighbors, but that there would be an escalation of tensions in 
the region that really have nothing to do with Japan, and that such tensions could erupt into 
conflict. 
 
A Constitutional Peace Clause as a Resolution to the Security Dilemma 
What Japan has experienced with its peace constitution over the last 60 years may have 
significance for finding a means to deal with the security dilemma for other countries as well. 
Particularly since the First World War, a means of defense that does not constitute a threat to 
others has been sought. For Japan, having a peace clause in the constitution has been a means of 
achieving this. Japan has successfully developed a powerful Self-Defense Force that, until the 
discussion of constitutional change became prominent, did not cause a great deal of threat to 
neighboring countries. In light of Japan’s history of aggression, its failure to resolve issues from 
the past with its neighbors, the ongoing mistrust of its neighbors, and also in spite of the serious 
tensions in the area—tensions in which Japan’s stance is definitely not one of neutrality—this 
phenomenon of maintaining a strong military force without that force being seen as a threat is a 
very strong indication of the potential of a constitutional peace clause to remove or at least 
minimize a sense of threat. In this sense, then, the Japanese constitution has shown a way 
forward in dealing with the security dilemma. 
For decades pacifists and peace activists have advocated disarmament. This unfortunately 
has been to no avail. The quantity of arms in the world, and their degree of destructiveness, has 
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continued to escalate. There is too much fear, and those in power can all too easily create an 
atmosphere of fear. If more and more countries would include a clause in their constitution 
similar to the peace clause in the Japanese constitution, this could help to alleviate the 
atmosphere of fear that makes disarmament so difficult.  
There seems little reason for a country not to introduce a clause similar to the one that Japan 
has. Japan has already shown that such a clause can be made compatible with having an 
adequate means of defense. It therefore does not make the country more vulnerable to attack or 
less able to defend itself. But as long as the country is sufficiently democratic and has a 
sufficiently independent judiciary to guarantee that the government cannot ignore the 
constitution or change it at will, such a clause will guarantee to neighboring countries that they 
will not be attacked. The spread of such a clause to the constitutions of other countries could 
therefore serve as a preliminary step towards making a broader disarmament possible. 
 
 
II. ARTICLE 9 AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 
 
One dimension of the defense rationale for changing the constitution is the argument that, 
given its dependence on the United States, Japan needs to be able to exercise the right of 
collective self defense.35 The move to change article 9 became prominent in the period following 
the Gulf War. Japan was severely criticized for the fact that its only contribution to the Gulf War 
was financial. There was the perception that, given its standing as the world’s second largest 
economy, Japan should be making more of a contribution to international society.  
Much of the argument for this has come from the United States.36 It is one of the paradoxes of 
the current move toward constitutional revision that, although one of the arguments used in 
favor of changing the constitution is that it was forced on Japan by the United States, the 
movement for constitutional change itself is being promoted under pressure from the US. The 
fact that the discussion emerged because of Japan’s limited level of cooperation in the Gulf War 
and under pressure from the United States to increase its contribution to the alliance suggests 
that it is Japan’s international cooperation, particularly in the area of collective defense but also 
in regard to cooperation in UN peace-keeping operations, that is driving the move towards 
constitutional change. This becomes even more clear when the present policy of transformation 
of the US military and the concomitant policy of interoperability between the Japanese Self 
Defense Force and the US military is taken into consideration.37  
It would be a mistake, therefore, to see the move towards constitutional change as an 
expression of increasing Japanese self-assertiveness. There are some who see it this way. Claude 
Larsimont of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center refers to Japan as 
“manifestly losing its military reserve, with the ‘Japan that can say no’ coming to the fore.”38 
This is not a particularly accurate reading of the situation. Rather, constitutional change is 
being promoted in Japan by administrations, such as those of Koizumi and Abe, that are avid 
about aligning Japan with US interests and policies. The movement for constitutional change 
does not represent the emergence of a self-assertive Japan, but the reemergence of a Japan that 
cannot say “no,” a Japan that acquiesces to the United States. 
Japan has essentially been in alliance with the US since its defeat in 1945, an alliance  
formalized in a security treaty in 1951 and again in 1960. This is the only formal international 
military alliance that Japan has and, although exercising the right of collective self-defense is not 
necessarily limited to formal alliances, when the issue of exercising collective self-defense is 
given as a reason for changing Japan’s constitution, the most obvious reference is to this alliance 
with the US. At present, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the 
United States of America restricts Japan’s cooperation with the US to defense against attacks 
made within Japanese administered territory.39 A change of the constitution would enable Japan 
to participate in the defense of the US even when the attack against these countries did not take 
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place in Japanese administered territory. 
 
Risks in Alliances 
Just as Japan has been protected from the security dilemma by article 9 of the constitution, 
this same article has protected it from the risks associated with alliances, namely the risks of 
entrapment and abandonment. It may be that the Japanese are not all that aware of these risks. 
Entrapment refers to the risk of being drawn into the conflicts of an allied country that are of no 
importance to one’s own interest. The risk of abandonment is of course the risk that, in spite of an 
alliance, one’s ally might not come to the rescue when help is needed. These risks are particularly 
enhanced when there is a high level of disparity in the relative strengths of the two allies. A 
relatively weak country, dependent for its security on a fairly strong country, especially if faced 
with threats to its security that exceed its capacity for self-defense, will have little choice but to 
accede to the wishes of its more powerful partner.  
A case in point would be Australia’s relationship with England in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Afraid of invasion from Asia and with too small a population to defend itself, 
Australia was dependent on England for its security. The result was that Australia sent forces to 
the Sudan in the 1880s, to the Boer War from 1899 to 1902, to the First World War, and to the 
Second World War even before the attack on Pearl Harbor and therefore before the war directly 
impinged on Australia. The price paid in these wars was enormous. In the Gallipoli campaign in 
1915, of 50,000 Australian soldiers committed to the battle, there were at least 26,000 casualties 
with 8,000 killed.40 Of roughly 22,000 stationed in Tobruk from April to December 1941, there 
were 3,009 casualties with 834 killed.41 These battles were not exclusively a result of entrapment. 
The Middle East lay on the route between Britain and Australia and was important to Australia 
both for trade and for defense. But Australia’s dependence on Britain was a very important factor, 
and there has been a perception in Australia (as can be seen in such movies as Breaker Morant 
and Gallipoli) that Australian soldiers were sacrificed more readily than British. What this 
means, of course, is that the cost of entrapment can be extremely high, and is likely to be so when 
the sense of dependence of one party of the alliance on the other is high. To consider the 
significance of this for Japan, it is enough to consider what would have been the role of Japan in 
Iraq if it had not had the peace clause in its constitution.  
Australia also provides an example of abandonment. The siege of Tobruk, a very important 
battle for one of the main ports in North Africa, lasted from April 10 to December 7, 1941. 
December 7, 1941, is a significant date, for that is the day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. 
Therefore the whole battle of Tobruk took place before the beginning of the war in the Pacific and 
therefore before there was a direct threat to Australia. Australia was supporting Britain in its 
war. Yet it is now known that while that very battle was going on, Britain had taken the decision 
not to defend Australia if it came under attack from Japan.42 The reasons for this are obvious. 
Britain simply had its hands full with Germany. But the reasons do not change the consequences 
for the country that is abandoned and the incident shows that alliances may well be subordinated 
to other strategic considerations, even when one’s own side has a record of contributing a great 
deal to the alliance partner. Since Australia’s fear of Asia now appears to have been misplaced, it 
can be take as an indication that erroneous threat perceptions, as well as having the possibility of 
triggering an escalation of threat and counter-threat as discussed in relation to the security 
dilemma, can also be the occasion for alliances that may become too servile or entail an 
unreasonable degree of sacrifice—a somewhat different outcome, but with the potential to 
become as harmful to one’s own country as the security dilemma. 
 
Article 9 and the Risks of Alliance 
It is sometimes argued in Japan that changing article 9 would enable Japan to enhance its 
capacity for self-defense and would therefore be a means of reducing Japan’s dependence on the 
US. We have already seen that article 9, in fact, has not been a limiting factor in Japan’s 
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development of a capacity for defense and therefore there is little reason to believe that changing 
article 9 would enhance that. More importantly, if, as has already been suggested, a change in 
article 9 would occasion an arms race in North East Asia, it is very unlikely that Japan could 
keep up with China in that arms race. China’s sheer size along with its burgeoning economy 
make it very likely that Japan, with its declining birthrate, it’s dependence on agricultural 
imports, its relative smallness, would not be able to keep up. It is likely that Japan’s dependency 
on the US would actually increase. This would make Japan significantly more vulnerable to the 
risks entailed in alliances. If one opts for worst-case thinking, it could feasibly also increase US 
military interventions overseas (depending, of course, on the kind of administrations that come to 
power in the US) by providing the US with a significant number of non-US soldiers whose deaths 
would be less likely to stimulate an anti-war movement in the US. 
 
Alliance vs. Multilateralism 
The comparison with Australia may be apt in that both countries appear to have a tendency to 
seek security in an alliance with a particularly strong country rather than in multilateral 
relationships among relatively smaller powers.43 At the beginning of the twentieth centuries, 
both countries made their alliance with Britain the basis of their security, and since the Second 
World War, both have grounded their security in an alliance with the US. There may be a 
perception in both countries that such an alliance with the current world superpower enhances 
their own status in the world. Allan Patience suggests that the “security alliance each has with 
its ‘great and powerful friend’ has led to widespread beliefs in both countries that because each 
has a special relationship with the USA, each therefore has a special standing in regional and 
global affairs.”44  
What is important here is to realize that the security dilemma is relevant to alliances as well 
as to arms build-ups. In other words, alliances can affect a countries relationship to countries 
that are not part of that alliance, possibly causing estrangement and even posing a threat which 
may provoke other countries to form a counter alliance. A change in article 9 of the constitution 
would, as has already been noted, deepen Japan’s dependence on the US and thereby further 
estrange Japan from its neighbors. It would be an option, in effect if not in intent, for bilateralism 
over multilateralism. It would greatly hinder Japan’s capacity for participating in the 
multilateralism that is growing in the Asia-Pacific region,45 and would therefore limit the scope 
of that multilateralism. It is hard to envisage that this would be a contribution to promoting 
sustainable peace in the region. Multilateralism shows more promise of establishing a basis for 
peace without provoking the problems associated with the security dilemma and with a 
substantial reduction in the risks involved in alliances. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I have focused on the defense rationale for changing Japan’s constitution and I 
have addressed this from the perspective of the security dilemma and from the perspective of the 
risks involved in alliances, namely the risks of entrapment and abandonment. The reason for 
focusing on these two aspects is that although they seem to be very important issues, they get 
relatively little attention in the debate on constitutional change in Japan. The probable reason 
for this is that Japanese are not all that aware of these issues since they have been protected 
from the associated problems for sixty years by the peace constitution. Changing the constitution 
is likely to be another case of “you don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone.” Both from the point 
of view of the security dilemma, and for the preference of multilateralism over bilateralism, the 
clear suggestion is that conserving the peace clause in the constitution is more likely to provide a 
basis for Japan and the region. 
It has also been noted that Japan’s own experience with the peace constitution over the last 
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sixty years shows a possible way to resolve the security dilemma for other countries as 
well—namely by inserting a peace clause in the constitution. 
Finally, considerations of constitutional change in Japan, like discussions of security 
anywhere, must focus on the real threats the country faces. It is easy to stir up fears regarding 
threats but we have already noted that there are great risks involved in threat perceptions. In 
the world today, some of the most serious threats that countries face are non-military in nature. 
Without a doubt, the most serious threat that all countries face is global warming. There are 
other threats associated with the environment, and issues such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, migration, 
etc., that will require a level of international cooperation hitherto unknown. Military tensions 
tend to become all-preoccupying. If military tensions increase, it is very unlikely that the will and 
resources to deal with these other problems will be found. The kind of tension that would result 
from Japan changing its constitution would not help in dealing with these non-military threats. 
The resolution of tensions that would result from a peace clause being included in the 
constitutions of other countries, on the other hand, would be a powerful contribution. 
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